An interview with Tom Ricks, journalist and author of the article What Ever Happened to Accountability? His latest book is The Generals: American Military Command from World War II to Today.
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TRANSCRIPT
JULIA KIRBY: Welcome to the HBR IdeaCast. I'm Julia Kirby. And I have the pleasure of hosting Tom Ricks today. For those of you who don't know his work, Tom is a journalist whose beat, for a long time, has been the US military. He covered it for the Washington Post from 2000 to 2008, and before that, for the Wall Street Journal. These days he's at the Center for a New American Security and serves as a contributing editor at Foreign Policy magazine. He's also written several books. And his new one is called, The Generals: American Military Command from World War II to Today. Welcome Tom.
TOM RICKS: Thank you very much. It's great to be here.
JULIA KIRBY: Now, HBR often looks to the military for lessons in management, whether it's in supply chain management or technology or leadership. And your article in our October issue focuses on that last topic. But it's called "Whatever Happened to Accountability." And it's describing a sort of pathology that you see in the leadership ranks of the US Army, which you absolutely don't think others should emulate. So why did you start looking into the Army's leadership ranks and the practices that shape them?
TOM RICKS: Well it's odd because the end of the book is kind of where I began. The book covers from 1939 to the present, looking at the generals of World War II, Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan. But for me, the genesis of the book came from being in Baghdad and watching very good soldiers, tactically excellent units, led by pour generals. Generals who didn't understand their jobs, who didn't think strategically, who really in many ways acted like jumped-up battalion commanders.
And watching that, I came to the conclusion that the major thing that went wrong in Iraq, after the mistake of doing the invasion at all, that the major thing that went wrong was generals who weren't able to adapt, to adjust, to understand the nature of the war they were fighting. Which after all is what Clausewitz, the great Prussian philosopher of war, calls the basic task of the general.
So I came to the conclusion that really it was our generalship that was poor. And I came to wonder why was it so different from World War II.
JULIA KIRBY: And I think you came to this conclusion that the main difference was this lack of accountability, or at least a lack of relief of command, right?
TOM RICKS: That's what struck me is that when you looked at these generals, they were very similar in characteristic and personality to their predecessors back in World War II. They had been trained much the same way, educated much the same way. The single biggest difference in our contemporary military from the more successful military of World War II was exactly as you say, accountability. In World War II, successful generals were rewarded, were promoted quickly. Eisenhower goes from a regimental executive officer to a five-star general in about four years. And he's representative of his peer group.
In subsequent wars, especially Vietnam and Iraq, success was not rewarded. Failure was not punished. Everybody kind of became risk averse. And you have a military leadership that seems to veer towards mediocrity and stalemate. And the problem with this is you end up expending a lot of blood and treasure. But without leadership, you don't get much of anywhere.
JULIA KIRBY: So the problem is the generals. And we know the facts. And there's no debating that generals used to be relieved of command quite often. And now it practically never happens. So you make an important point about the lasting damage that happens when standards aren't upheld in leadership ranks and mediocrity begins to infect them. And it isn't just the unfairness to the individuals involved, is it?
TOM RICKS: No, I think it's unfair to the soldiers being led. This is, literally, a life-and-death activity. When generals don't adapt, people die for no good reason, both soldiers and Iraqi civilians in this instance. More importantly to the nation, we don't move towards victory, towards outcomes, towards success. We have generals who really don't think it's their job to think about the end game. That's, somehow, they decided the job of politicians. And that's really an abdication of responsibility.
If in World War II a general had said it wasn't his job to think about the outcome, I think he would have been fired. Lots and lots of generals were fired in World War II, as you alluded to. Of the 165 men who commanded combat divisions in World War II, that is divisions actually in combat, 15 were released.
JULIA KIRBY: Wow. So the real problem that kind of manifests over time, if you're not doing a constant pruning and cultivating of those leadership ranks, is that you're really losing that ability to even think strategically. Is that it?
TOM RICKS: Yeah, you have an organization that, overall, seems to move towards mediocrity rather than towards excellence. When no one takes risks, risk-takers are disproportionately punished because they stand out like sore thumbs. But also that's right. You don't get strategic outcomes.
We've had a series of recent actions, Panama, the 1991 Gulf War, the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, in which generals sincerely believed that it was not their job to think about the end of the war. So we've had organizations that are very successful at getting into the war, which is a difference from US history in the past, but not very successful in bringing these wars to conclusions. They really don't think about conclusions.
That's such a striking difference from World War II when the Army chief of staff, George Marshall, thought very clearly about where this war was going and insisted on separating what was essential from what was merely important. There are a lot of important things when you're fighting a global war. But he was ruthless in deciding what was essential, what could be put off for a day or two, and ruthless in deciding who were the right people for these jobs and who simply wasn't cutting it.
JULIA KIRBY: Yeah, so you draw that stark contrast in your article between General Marshall and another general, General Maxwell Taylor. I guess if those are the things that we should take away from Marshall as advice on leadership cultivation, then what are the bad things that we should avoid that General Taylor did?
TOM RICKS: George Marshall and Maxwell Taylor are almost opposites. Marshall, of course, is the Army chief of staff, a very important position in World War II. Maxwell Taylor was the Army chief of staff in the late 1950s and then the chairman of Joint Chiefs under President Kennedy in the early 1960s.
They are opposites in that Marshall insisted on candor from his subordinates and also insisted on giving candor to his superiors. When he spoke to FDR, the president during World War II, he was ruthless in is honesty. In fact, that's one reason he was given the job. Because he was one of the few people who seemed willing to stand up to Roosevelt in meetings. Roosevelt could be almost bullying in his cajoling of people, kind of charming but getting his own way. And Marshall, even before he became Army chief of staff, would say no, Mister President, that's not right, or no, I disagree.
He also kept his distance from the president. It's striking to me, for example, that George Marshall never visited President Roosevelt at Roosevelt's getaway in Hyde Park, New York until Roosevelt was dead. He went there the first time in his life for the funeral for the present.
By contrast, Maxwell Taylor, when he became adviser to President Kennedy before he became chairman of the Joint Chiefs, made the White House his base. He was a very politicized officer. He was not trusted by the other members of the Joint Chiefs when he became chairman of the Joint Chiefs. And where Marshall had insisted on integrity and candor and being very clear with your superiors, Taylor was mendacious. He went behind the backs of other generals. He would not convey their honest views to the President of the United States. And went out of his way to make sure that the president didn't get the views of the other members of the Joint Chiefs.
JULIA KIRBY: Even this very interesting assertion in the piece that we can maybe blame the whole decision process of entering Vietnam on Army leadership. And that is the General Taylor and his fear that the Army was losing power, losing relevance vis a vis the other branches of the military.
TOM RICKS: Certainly that's a big part of it. In the 1950s the Army was adrift. It had a great World War II, a not so good Korean war. And then suddenly in the 1950s it finds itself overwhelmed by the advent of nuclear warfare. Nobody's really even sure if we need a ground force anymore. The Navy is going with nuclear submarines. The Air Force is building the B52. It's getting missiles and satellites. And the Army is dwindling.
By the late 1950s, when Maxwell Taylor is chief of staff of the Army, his budget was precisely half that of the Air Force's. And so Taylor begins looking around as chief of staff of the Army for what the Army could do. And he kind of decides let's go down to the low end of the spectrum. If the Air Force and the Navy are going to have nuclear war, we'll do the brush fire wars. And Vietnam looks like a nice, tasty example of where they can show this off. So he starts eyeing Vietnam when he's in the White House, even before he becomes chairman of the Joint Chiefs. He starts studying Vietnam and maybe what the military could do there.
JULIA KIRBY: So just to anticipate some takeaways for what we could learn for business people, it just seems like as we demand more accountability for meeting objectives, we need to make sure that the objectives themselves are right and that they're transparent.
TOM RICKS: I think there's a ton of lessons in looking at Marshall and his predecessors. And there's a lot to learn from the Army. They've done a good job in several areas, recruiting people, in building a diverse workforce, in maintaining cohesion and morale. That said, I think there are some very negative lessons from leadership. The Army seems to have lost that connection, fundamentally, on accountability between rewarding success and punishing failure.
There's other related lessons to that. Candor is so important in talking to one's superiors. Something that I would take away as a business person is a good meeting is not necessarily a pleasant meeting. When you are going in to a crisis situation, you really need to examine your differences. And that means some pretty heated arguments. You need to say you're assuming this, but this other guy's assuming this. Why are your assumptions different? And that might be a heated argument. So a pleasant meeting is not necessarily the productive one.
Analyze differences and examine them. Where do they come from? Why do we think differently about this? And finally, examine harshly a strategy. Look at it from the enemy perspective. What would he do? How will he react? And as Marshall and Eisenhower both were fond of pointing out, in looking at strategy, separate the essential from the merely important. Strategy is, in many ways, about prioritizing. What must we do versus what we would want to do. What are the two or three things that really are essential here?
And that's really where Marshall was so good in World War II because once you pick strategy and say this is what we're going to do, then you can measure your people against that. Who was helping us fulfill that strategy? Who doesn't understand it? Or who else is getting in the way of that strategy? And then you can make personnel decisions against your strategy and have a very effective institution.
JULIA KIRBY: Tom, I know your focus is on the military. But if a corporate board were to consult with you, then all of that would be perfectly applicable advice to the problems they face. Thank you so much for talking to us today.
TOM RICKS: Thank you very much.
JULIA KIRBY: That was Tom Ricks. His article is "Whatever Happened to Accountability" in the October 2012 edition of Harvard Business Review. For more, go to HBR.org. Thanks for joining us. And have a great day.
Download this podcast
TRANSCRIPT
JULIA KIRBY: Welcome to the HBR IdeaCast. I'm Julia Kirby. And I have the pleasure of hosting Tom Ricks today. For those of you who don't know his work, Tom is a journalist whose beat, for a long time, has been the US military. He covered it for the Washington Post from 2000 to 2008, and before that, for the Wall Street Journal. These days he's at the Center for a New American Security and serves as a contributing editor at Foreign Policy magazine. He's also written several books. And his new one is called, The Generals: American Military Command from World War II to Today. Welcome Tom.
TOM RICKS: Thank you very much. It's great to be here.
JULIA KIRBY: Now, HBR often looks to the military for lessons in management, whether it's in supply chain management or technology or leadership. And your article in our October issue focuses on that last topic. But it's called "Whatever Happened to Accountability." And it's describing a sort of pathology that you see in the leadership ranks of the US Army, which you absolutely don't think others should emulate. So why did you start looking into the Army's leadership ranks and the practices that shape them?
TOM RICKS: Well it's odd because the end of the book is kind of where I began. The book covers from 1939 to the present, looking at the generals of World War II, Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan. But for me, the genesis of the book came from being in Baghdad and watching very good soldiers, tactically excellent units, led by pour generals. Generals who didn't understand their jobs, who didn't think strategically, who really in many ways acted like jumped-up battalion commanders.
And watching that, I came to the conclusion that the major thing that went wrong in Iraq, after the mistake of doing the invasion at all, that the major thing that went wrong was generals who weren't able to adapt, to adjust, to understand the nature of the war they were fighting. Which after all is what Clausewitz, the great Prussian philosopher of war, calls the basic task of the general.
So I came to the conclusion that really it was our generalship that was poor. And I came to wonder why was it so different from World War II.
JULIA KIRBY: And I think you came to this conclusion that the main difference was this lack of accountability, or at least a lack of relief of command, right?
TOM RICKS: That's what struck me is that when you looked at these generals, they were very similar in characteristic and personality to their predecessors back in World War II. They had been trained much the same way, educated much the same way. The single biggest difference in our contemporary military from the more successful military of World War II was exactly as you say, accountability. In World War II, successful generals were rewarded, were promoted quickly. Eisenhower goes from a regimental executive officer to a five-star general in about four years. And he's representative of his peer group.
In subsequent wars, especially Vietnam and Iraq, success was not rewarded. Failure was not punished. Everybody kind of became risk averse. And you have a military leadership that seems to veer towards mediocrity and stalemate. And the problem with this is you end up expending a lot of blood and treasure. But without leadership, you don't get much of anywhere.
JULIA KIRBY: So the problem is the generals. And we know the facts. And there's no debating that generals used to be relieved of command quite often. And now it practically never happens. So you make an important point about the lasting damage that happens when standards aren't upheld in leadership ranks and mediocrity begins to infect them. And it isn't just the unfairness to the individuals involved, is it?
TOM RICKS: No, I think it's unfair to the soldiers being led. This is, literally, a life-and-death activity. When generals don't adapt, people die for no good reason, both soldiers and Iraqi civilians in this instance. More importantly to the nation, we don't move towards victory, towards outcomes, towards success. We have generals who really don't think it's their job to think about the end game. That's, somehow, they decided the job of politicians. And that's really an abdication of responsibility.
If in World War II a general had said it wasn't his job to think about the outcome, I think he would have been fired. Lots and lots of generals were fired in World War II, as you alluded to. Of the 165 men who commanded combat divisions in World War II, that is divisions actually in combat, 15 were released.
JULIA KIRBY: Wow. So the real problem that kind of manifests over time, if you're not doing a constant pruning and cultivating of those leadership ranks, is that you're really losing that ability to even think strategically. Is that it?
TOM RICKS: Yeah, you have an organization that, overall, seems to move towards mediocrity rather than towards excellence. When no one takes risks, risk-takers are disproportionately punished because they stand out like sore thumbs. But also that's right. You don't get strategic outcomes.
We've had a series of recent actions, Panama, the 1991 Gulf War, the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, in which generals sincerely believed that it was not their job to think about the end of the war. So we've had organizations that are very successful at getting into the war, which is a difference from US history in the past, but not very successful in bringing these wars to conclusions. They really don't think about conclusions.
That's such a striking difference from World War II when the Army chief of staff, George Marshall, thought very clearly about where this war was going and insisted on separating what was essential from what was merely important. There are a lot of important things when you're fighting a global war. But he was ruthless in deciding what was essential, what could be put off for a day or two, and ruthless in deciding who were the right people for these jobs and who simply wasn't cutting it.
JULIA KIRBY: Yeah, so you draw that stark contrast in your article between General Marshall and another general, General Maxwell Taylor. I guess if those are the things that we should take away from Marshall as advice on leadership cultivation, then what are the bad things that we should avoid that General Taylor did?
TOM RICKS: George Marshall and Maxwell Taylor are almost opposites. Marshall, of course, is the Army chief of staff, a very important position in World War II. Maxwell Taylor was the Army chief of staff in the late 1950s and then the chairman of Joint Chiefs under President Kennedy in the early 1960s.
They are opposites in that Marshall insisted on candor from his subordinates and also insisted on giving candor to his superiors. When he spoke to FDR, the president during World War II, he was ruthless in is honesty. In fact, that's one reason he was given the job. Because he was one of the few people who seemed willing to stand up to Roosevelt in meetings. Roosevelt could be almost bullying in his cajoling of people, kind of charming but getting his own way. And Marshall, even before he became Army chief of staff, would say no, Mister President, that's not right, or no, I disagree.
He also kept his distance from the president. It's striking to me, for example, that George Marshall never visited President Roosevelt at Roosevelt's getaway in Hyde Park, New York until Roosevelt was dead. He went there the first time in his life for the funeral for the present.
By contrast, Maxwell Taylor, when he became adviser to President Kennedy before he became chairman of the Joint Chiefs, made the White House his base. He was a very politicized officer. He was not trusted by the other members of the Joint Chiefs when he became chairman of the Joint Chiefs. And where Marshall had insisted on integrity and candor and being very clear with your superiors, Taylor was mendacious. He went behind the backs of other generals. He would not convey their honest views to the President of the United States. And went out of his way to make sure that the president didn't get the views of the other members of the Joint Chiefs.
JULIA KIRBY: Even this very interesting assertion in the piece that we can maybe blame the whole decision process of entering Vietnam on Army leadership. And that is the General Taylor and his fear that the Army was losing power, losing relevance vis a vis the other branches of the military.
TOM RICKS: Certainly that's a big part of it. In the 1950s the Army was adrift. It had a great World War II, a not so good Korean war. And then suddenly in the 1950s it finds itself overwhelmed by the advent of nuclear warfare. Nobody's really even sure if we need a ground force anymore. The Navy is going with nuclear submarines. The Air Force is building the B52. It's getting missiles and satellites. And the Army is dwindling.
By the late 1950s, when Maxwell Taylor is chief of staff of the Army, his budget was precisely half that of the Air Force's. And so Taylor begins looking around as chief of staff of the Army for what the Army could do. And he kind of decides let's go down to the low end of the spectrum. If the Air Force and the Navy are going to have nuclear war, we'll do the brush fire wars. And Vietnam looks like a nice, tasty example of where they can show this off. So he starts eyeing Vietnam when he's in the White House, even before he becomes chairman of the Joint Chiefs. He starts studying Vietnam and maybe what the military could do there.
JULIA KIRBY: So just to anticipate some takeaways for what we could learn for business people, it just seems like as we demand more accountability for meeting objectives, we need to make sure that the objectives themselves are right and that they're transparent.
TOM RICKS: I think there's a ton of lessons in looking at Marshall and his predecessors. And there's a lot to learn from the Army. They've done a good job in several areas, recruiting people, in building a diverse workforce, in maintaining cohesion and morale. That said, I think there are some very negative lessons from leadership. The Army seems to have lost that connection, fundamentally, on accountability between rewarding success and punishing failure.
There's other related lessons to that. Candor is so important in talking to one's superiors. Something that I would take away as a business person is a good meeting is not necessarily a pleasant meeting. When you are going in to a crisis situation, you really need to examine your differences. And that means some pretty heated arguments. You need to say you're assuming this, but this other guy's assuming this. Why are your assumptions different? And that might be a heated argument. So a pleasant meeting is not necessarily the productive one.
Analyze differences and examine them. Where do they come from? Why do we think differently about this? And finally, examine harshly a strategy. Look at it from the enemy perspective. What would he do? How will he react? And as Marshall and Eisenhower both were fond of pointing out, in looking at strategy, separate the essential from the merely important. Strategy is, in many ways, about prioritizing. What must we do versus what we would want to do. What are the two or three things that really are essential here?
And that's really where Marshall was so good in World War II because once you pick strategy and say this is what we're going to do, then you can measure your people against that. Who was helping us fulfill that strategy? Who doesn't understand it? Or who else is getting in the way of that strategy? And then you can make personnel decisions against your strategy and have a very effective institution.
JULIA KIRBY: Tom, I know your focus is on the military. But if a corporate board were to consult with you, then all of that would be perfectly applicable advice to the problems they face. Thank you so much for talking to us today.
TOM RICKS: Thank you very much.
JULIA KIRBY: That was Tom Ricks. His article is "Whatever Happened to Accountability" in the October 2012 edition of Harvard Business Review. For more, go to HBR.org. Thanks for joining us. And have a great day.